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NOTES
INFORMATION FAMINE, DUE PROCESS, AND THE
REVISED CLASS ACTION RULE: WHEN
SHOULD COURTS PROVIDE A SECOND
OPPORTUNITY TO OPT OUT?
Jeannette Cox>"
INTRODUCTION

Imagine your friend Alice, a young mother, comes to you for ad
vice. Her baby has severe birth defects, which likely resulted from the
morning sickness drug Alice took when she was pregnant. Alice has
incurred tremendous hospital bills for her child and is afraid she will
not have enough money to pay for the additional surgeries her child
will need in the future. After looking over the documents she recently
received, you tell her she has a fast-approaching deadline to decide
whether to commit herself to accepting a settlement from the com
pany that manufactured the morning sickness drug. Understandably,
Alice wants to know how much she would receive under the settle
ment and is frustrated because the documents she received do not
give her this information. To her great astonishment, you explain
that the settlement does not yet exist and there is no way to predict
how much the settlement might ultimately provide her. Anticipating
her next question, you then tell her that she will not be able to learn
the settlement's terms before the deadline for accepting or rejecting
them. In fact, you know the attorney who represents her has barely
begun negotiations with the pharmaceutical company.
What you are explaining to Alice is that her claim against the
pharmaceutical company has become part of a traditional class action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3). The class action al* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.A., Hanover
College, 2001. Special thanks to Professor Jay Tidmarsh, Notre Dame Law School,
who provided invaluable suggestions regarding this note topic.
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lows a court to deal with the large number of similar claims against
the pharmaceutical company in a single lawsuit that will more than
likely result in a court-approved settlement. If Alice stays in the class
action, her claim will be conclusively decided by the class action and
she will-hopefully-receive a check from the pharmaceutical com
pany. Alice also has the option to exclude herself from the class, or
"opt out," if she thinks she can obtain a more favorable settlement or
judgment by bringing an individual lawsuit. The catch is that Alice
must decide, right now, whether to bind herself to accept the settle
ment that the class action will ultimately yield or to opt out and go it
alone. 1 If she stays in the class action, settlement negotiations will be
entirely out of her hands. She will have no authority to reject pro
posed settlements and will simply receive whatever remedy the class
settlement provides. If she feels the settlement is unfair, her recourse
will be to become an objector and attempt to persuade the court to
withhold its approval of the settlement. Alternatively, she may entreat
class counsel to renegotiate with the defendant. Neither avenue of
protest is likely to be successful. 2 So, Alice must choose today whether
she will opt out of the settlement or accept whatever amount the class
action ultimately provides.
With a lawyer's help, Alice can roughly estimate how much she
could recover in an individual lawsuit, but this information is not suffi
cient to make an informed opt-out decision because she cannot know
the value of the class settlement. The class action might be a better
option or it might be much worse. Either way, Alice is stuck. Her
choice is a painful real life parallel to the dilemma often posed to
game show contestants: whether to accept a prize they have seen or
reject it in favor of the unknown prize behind door number two. For
Alice, the choice is not simply a gamble for the greater of two wind
falls. Rather, her gamble is to pick the avenue that will come closest
to covering her debt to the hospital and her child's future surgeries.
1 Because Rule 23(b)(3) requires that class members receive notice and an op
portunity for exclusion "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an ac
tion brought as a class action," opt-out deadlines often expire before claimholders
possess enough information about the value of their claims to make an informed
decision about whether to opt out. FED. R. CN. P. 23(c)(l); see Report of the Judicial
Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 215 F.R.D. 158, 189
(2003) [hereinafter 2003 Report of Rules Committee].
2 As at least one court has acknowledged, the ability to appear to contest a settle
ment often is insufficient to protect a person's property interest in her cause of ac
tion. See Colt Indus. S'holder Litig. v. Colt Indus. Inc., 566 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (N.Y.
1991) ("Despite the fact that Merritt had notice of the action and could have chosen
to appear to contest the settlement, we do not believe that this was sufficient to pro
tect Merritt's property interest in its cause of action.").
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If she does not opt out of the class action, she commits herself to
accepting whatever money the class settlement provides and forgoes
her opportunity to pursue an individual lawsuit.
This Note contends that, in appropriate circumstances, judges
overseeing class litigation should exercise their discretion to provide
class members like Alice a second chance to opt out at the time when
settlement terms are known. Such an opportunity comports with the
plaintiffs traditional due process right to exert control over her claim
and simultaneously recognizes the need to efficiently resolve large
numbers of similar claims. Judges should provide a second opt-out
opportunity when two factors are present: (1) when class members did
not have sufficient information to make an informed choice by the
opt-out deadline and (2) when a significant number of the claims
would be economically viable in individual litigation. When both of
these factors are present, a class member's interest in controlling her
claim will normally outweigh the efficiency gains that might be
achieved by denying class members a second opportunity to opt out.
I.

THE 2003 REVISION TO RULE 23

In December 2003, Congress approved several revis10ns to the
federal class action rule. Among these revisions was a new provision
that gave courts discretionary authority to direct a second opt-out op
portunity when the parties reach settlement terms.3 The added text
provides: "In an action previously certified as a class action under Rule
23(b)(3), the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it af
fords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class mem
bers who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not
do so." 4
As the Federal Rules Advisory Committee explains, at a "basic
level, the second opt-out opportunity gives class members the same
opportunity to accept or reject a proposed settlement as persons enjoy
in individual lawsuits."5 It also "introduces a measure of class-member
self-determination and control that best harmonizes the class action
with traditional litigation. "6 The Committee further explains:
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3). Prior to the revision, severaljudges had already ap
proved settlements requiring a second opt-out opportunity. See, e.g., In re Silicone
Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521,
at *17 (N.D. Ala. Sept. l, 1994).
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3).
5 2003 Report of Rules Committee, supra note l, at 189-90.
6 Id. at 190.
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The presumption of consent that follows a failure to affirmatively
opt out at the time of certification may lose its footing when circum
stances have changed materially from the time when the class action
is finally settled. In these cases, a second opt-out opportunity could
relieve individuals from the unforeseen consequences of inaction or
decisions made at the time of certification, when limited meaning
ful information was available. 7

Though the revision to Rule 23 makes clear that judges may di
rect a second opt-out opportunity, it provides very little guidance as to
what factors judges should consider to decide whether to do so. The
Committee's comments simply state that "[t]here is no presumption
that a second opt-out opportunity should be afforded" and the "ques
tion is left entirely to the court's discretion."8 Perhaps the most signif
icant guidance for courts is that the Committee considered but
declined to adopt a revision that would have automatically provided a
second opt-out opportunity.9
As of September 2004, only two reported opinions have grappled
with the question of when courts should provide a second opt-out op
portunity pursuant to Rule 23's new opt-out provision. 10 Both de
clined to provide the second opt-out opportunity.I I In one of those
cases, the judge acknowledged that Rule 23 now allows courts to direct
a second opt-out opportunity, but concluded that "[b]ecause I have
approved these [s]ettlements as fair ... due process does not afford
[c]lass members a second opportunity to opt out."I 2 The judge's deci7 Id.
8 Id. at 190.
9 The Committee considered a revision that would have "direct[ed] that notice
of the proposed settlement afford a new opportunity to elect exclusion unless the
court finds good cause to deny the opportunity." Id. at 243. The Committee chose
the discretionary version over the mandatory version amidst concern from members
of the bar that an automatic second opt-out opportunity would impede settlement.
See id. at 244 ("The common observation that the proposal may make it more difficult
to reach a settlement agreement was divided between the view that the result will be
better terms for class members and the view that good settlements may be defeated by
a settlement opt-out opportunity.").
10 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust, MDL No. 1426, 2004 WL 1068807, at *3
(E.D. Pa. May 11, 2004); In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp.
2d 503 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). Another court noted, without comment, that the class had
enjoyed a second opportunity to opt out after the settlement terms were reached
pursuant to the revised rule. In re AMF Bowling, No. 99 Civ. 3023(PKC), 2004 WL
2049277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2004).
11 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust, 2004 WL 1068807 at *3; In re Visa Check/
Mastennoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 518 n.18.
12 See In re Visa Check/Mastennoney Antitrust Litig, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 518 n.18 (in
ternal citations omitted).
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sion may have been influenced by the Federal Rules Advisory Commit
tee's suggestion that a second opt out can "provide[] an opportunity
to gain information that the court can use in evaluating the proposed
settlement." 13 By focusing on this language, the judge could have
concluded that informed opt out is necessary only when the court re
viewing the class settlement suspects that the settlement is unfair.
This Note, by contrast, contends that the purpose and need for
informed opt out is much greater than simply to give judges informa
tion about whether a proposed settlement is fair. If judges provide a
second opt-out opportunity only when settlements are unfair, the revi
sion adds nothing to the rule. Rule 23 already required judges to
withhold their approval of unfair settlements. Informed opt out
should be viewed not simply as a tool for courts to gather information
about the fairness of a settlement, but as an important procedural
safeguard that protects the right of claimholders to exert control over
their claims.
II.

SUMMARY

The first part of this Note argues that the traditional conception
of a plaintiffs right to exert control over her claim, the history of Rule
23, and the emerging concern about "information famine" in the con
text of class action settlements make an informed opt-out opportunity
appropriate for most class actions involving damages claims. Though
the current majority view is that due process does not require a sec
ond opportunity to opt out, there is strong evidence that the drafters
of Rule 23 believed that the purpose of the right to opt out was to
enable potential class members to intelligently decide whether to stay
in the class action. Furthermore, recent class action settlement cases
from the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals evidence a growing
concern that the inability of class members to intelligently exercise
their right to opt out violates due process. Much like "future claim
ant" class members who cannot evaluate the adequacy of a proposed
settlement because they have not yet suffered injury, class members
who must decide whether to opt out before settlement terms are
known cannot evaluate whether their interests would be better served
by opting out or remaining in the class.
The second part of this Note proposes a two-factored test courts
should employ to decide whether to exercise their discretionary au
thority to provide an opportunity for class members to opt out after
settlement terms are known. A court should first consider whether
13

2003 Report of Rules Committee, supra note 1, at 243.
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the class members had insufficient information at the initial opt-out
deadline to decide whether to stay in the class. In some situations, the
settlement terms may have been known or readily estimable and thus
the class members actually had sufficient information to make an in
formed decision. Second, the court should consider whether the class
action contains claims large enough to be economically viable in indi
vidual litigation. The presence of such claims strongly argues for an
opportunity for class members to make an informed opt-out decision.
If both of these factors are present, the court should provide an in
formed opt-out opportunity. The Note concludes by arguing that in
formed opt out will not undermine the efficiency of (b)(3) class
actions.

III.

STRIKING A BALANCE: THE FEDERAL CLASS ACTION RULE

The federal class action rule attempts to strike an acceptable bal
ance between the rights of individual plaintiffs to exert control over
the fate of their claims and the benefits of simultaneously resolving
similar claims as a group. The current compromise between effi
ciency and individual rights has yielded a system that guarantees class
members different due process rights depending on the character of
their claims. The rule designates three general types of class actions,
each providing their members different levels of procedural protec
tion. Class members like Alice, with individual damages claims, are
entitled (1) to be adequately represented by a party with the same
interests, 14 (2) to receive notice that their claims will be conclusively
determined by the class judgment or settlement, 15 and (3) to have an
opportunity to opt out of the class action to bring an individual
claim. 16 These class actions fall under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3) and are commonly called "(b)(3) class actions." They are
also known as "opt-out" class actions because the other two types of
class actions-certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2)-do
not provide class members the right to opt out. 17 This is because the
(b) (1) and (b)(2) provisions address special situations where there is
an overwhelming need to resolve all the class members' claims in one
lawsuit because a multiplicity of lawsuits would be harmful to the
class. 18 Class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(1) often involve situa14 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2).
16 Id.
17 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
18 In (b)(l) and (b)(2) class actions, the benefits of simultaneous resolution of
the entire class's claims outweigh the costs of limiting the rights of the individual class

THE R E VIS ED CLASS ACTION RULE

tions in which a court must resolve all potential claims in one suit
because there are insufficient funds to cover the claims. Class actions
brought under Rule 23(b) (2) often involve injunctive relief where
multiple suits would inflict inconsistent obligations on the defendant.
This Note focuses on (b) (3) class actions. In (b) (3) class actions, Rule
23 guarantees class members an opportunity to opt out, but does not
require that the opt-out opportunity occur at a time when class mem
bers have knowledge of the settlement terms. Generally, the opt-out
deadline occurs shortly after class certification and before settlement
terms are known. 19
Since the creation of the (b) (3) class action, both practitioners
and academics have vigorously debated the proper place of opt-out
rights in class actions and whether class members should be able to
opt out at all. The debate reflects a lack of consensus about how to
balance each class member's interest in controlling her claim with the
benefits of simultaneously resolving similar claims as a group. The
long-standing ideals of the American adversarial system suggest that
each class member with a traditional claim for money damages should
pos�ess the same unilateral authority to control her claim as is pos
sessed by individual plaintiffs. As Professor Roger Trangsrud notes, it
seems unfair to provide a plaintiff injured by a morning sickness drug

members. No opt-out rights are provided in class actions that involve limited fund
situations, covered by Rule 23(b)(l), because "the only question is how to divide up
the pie." In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 881 (6th Cir. 2000). All
persons who have a right to a piece of the limited fund must be present in order to
determine each claimholder's respective share. Opt-out rights are similarly denied in
(b)(2) class actions because it is simply impracticable for some members of the plain
tiff group to exempt themselves from the effect of the judgment. The (b)(2) class
action is used for fashioning broad equitable remedies for a defendant's wrongdo
ing-such as maintaining unconstitutional prison conditions or segregated schools
that affect a large class of people. For this type of class action, there is a strong need
"to avoid the possibility of conflicting judgments . . . which would subject the defend
ants to varying and possibly inconsistent obligations." Colt Indus. S'holder Litig. v.
Colt Indus. Inc., 566 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (N.Y. 1991). Accordingly, class members are
not given the option to opt out and pursue their claims individually because the "in
terest in promoting individual control of litigation is outweighed by the importance
of obtaining a single, binding determination." Id.
19 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS Ae
TION DILEMMAS: PuRSuING PUBLIC GoALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 75 (2000) ("Such early
notice means that at the time they learn of the case, potential class members cannot
know how it will be resolved and whether, or how much, they might be recompensed
for the alleged harms."); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH)§ 21.311 (2004)
("Ordinarily, notice to class members should be given promptly after the certification
order is issued.").
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fewer procedural rights than a plaintiff injured in a car accident.20
From the plaintiff's point of view, her injuries and need for compensa
tion are the same whether she was the only person harmed by the
defendant's negligence or one among thousands.
On the other side of the issue, the benefits of efficiently resolving
large numbers of similar claims have led some commentators, such as
Professor David Rosenberg, to recommend that the law should never
let so-called "mass tort" victims exert independent control over their
claims.21 Rosenberg proposes that Congress should transform (b)(3)
class actions into a vehicle for collective insurance whereby mass tort
victims receive damages according to the relative severity of their inju
ries rather than the relative strength of their claims.22 Accordingly,
Rosenberg argues that the law should not permit any one class mem
ber to derail the efficiency of group settlement by opting out of the
class.23 He recommends not only that courts should deny class mem
bers a second opportunity to opt out but also that Congress should
amend Rule 23 to eliminate the initial opt-out opportunity guaran
teed to (b)(3) class members.24

Rosenberg's proposal, while certainly efficient from a macro-ltvel
financial perspective, would abrogate the traditional right of a plain-

20 See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, U. ILL. L. REv.
69, 87 (1989).
Our civil justice system owes a twelve-year-old girl born with foreshortened
limbs after her mother took a prescribed morning sickness drug the same
due process it owes a thirty-two-year-old man paralyzed when the brakes on
his Chevrolet fail and his automobile slams into a tree.
Id.
21 See David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Dpt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost
Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19 [hereinafter Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt
Out]; David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual justice lYy Collective
Means, 62 IND. LJ. 561 (1987); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Expo
sure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 851 (1984); David
Rosenberg, Individual justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases,
71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 210 (1996); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The
Only option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARv. L. REv. 831 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg,
Mandatory-Litigation]; David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have
and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (2000); David Rosenberg, Of End Games
and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REv. 695
(1989); David Rosenberg, The Regulatory Advantage of Class Action, in REGULATION
THROUGH L ITIGATION 244 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002); Michael A. Perino, Class Action
Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions,
46 EMORY LJ. 85 (1997).
22 Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation, supra note 21, at 834.
23 Id. at 862.
24 Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out, supra note 21, at 23.
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tiff to exert control over her claim. It would effectively transfer that
control, by governmental fiat, to class attorneys and defense counsel.
The appropriate measure for whether particular compromises be
tween efficiency and individual rights are acceptable is rooted not
merely in concern for efficiency, but also in concern for the individual
procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 25
A.

Opt Out and Due Process

The Due Process Clause applies whenever the government threat
ens a person with deprivation of their life, liberty, or property. 26 Class
actions invoke the Due Process Clause because an individual's cause
of action is itself a "protected property interest in its own right." 27
The Supreme Court has frequently acknowledged that a cause of ac
tion is property, separate and apart from the property that makes up
the subject of the litigation. 28 Furthermore, the order of a court
including an order approving a class settlement-is a government act
that extinguishes a claimholder's property right in her cause of action.
In the class action context, the termination of claims through settle
ment is not merely a contractual exchange between the parties to the
litigation but a governmentally-created procedure that extinguishes
the claims of persons who-for most purposes-are not parties to the
litigation.
The fact that a class judgment or settlement can extinguish class
members' claims is a departure from the general rule that no one is
bound by a judgment to which he was not a party or a party's succes
sor in interest.29 In class actions, the actual plaintiff parties to the
case-the class representatives-litigate the case and decide whether
25 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) ("[O]ne might fairly say of
the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency.") (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)); cf.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997) ("The argument is
sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would pro
vide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos
exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution.").
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27 Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 804 (1996).
28 See id.; Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (noting that each
class member possesses a constitutionally protected property interest in his or her
claim); see also Colt Indus. S'holder Litig. v. Colt Indus. Inc., 566 N.E.2d 1160,
1167-68 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that a class member's damage claim was a constitution
ally protected right and that certain procedural requirements had to be met before
the class member could be bound by a class settlement).
29 Richards, 517 U.S. at 798 (citing Hansberryv. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
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to accept or reject settlements. In reality, the class attorney often
wields considerable power to make ultimate decisions and the class
representatives only nominally participate.30 The vast majority of class
members, who are not class representatives, have no authority to ac
cept or reject settlements or to otherwise direct the actions of the class
attorney. 31
The vulnerable position of (b) (3) class members underlies Rule
23's three protections for class members: adequate representation, no
tice, and the right to opt out. 32 The first two protections antedate the
modern Rule 23, which was adopted in 1966. In 1940, the Supreme
Court held that persons who are not parties to a lawsuit cannot be
bound by an order resolving it unless one of the parties adequately
represented them. 33 Thus, in the class action context, class represent
atives' interests must align with the interests of absent class members.
In 1950, the Court held that due process also requires that persons
who are not parties but whose rights will be conclusively determined
by the group litigation receive notice.34 The Court explained that
notice is "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due pro
cess in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality." 35
At the time Rule 23 was enacted, the Supreme Court had not
addressed opt-out rights. In fact, the creation of opt-out rights in 1966
represented a constriction of the procedural protections provided to
class members. Prior to 1966, members of the type of class actions
that roughly correspond to today's (b) (3) actions were not bound by a
class judgment or settlement unless they affirmatively opted into the
class.36 The class action did not bind anyone who did not choose to
enter into the class action and be bound by the judgment. Though
the Committee that drafted Rule 23 settled on an "opt out" rather
than an "opt in" rule, 37 the Committee stressed that class members
must receive notice of their right to opt out "to fulfill requirements of
30 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 19, at ll8.
31 Id.
32 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
33 Hansberry v. Lee, 3ll U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
34 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
35 Id.
36 See, e.g.,John E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to opt Out, 25 ARiz. L. REv. 3,
14-15 (1984).
37 The Rules Advisory Committee felt a departure from the "opt-in" rule was nec
essary because of their concern for promoting the mutuality of claim preclusion. The
mutuality rule, important in 1966, has since been discarded. See Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
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due process to which the class action procedure is of course subject." 38
There was "a strong feeling that the person who wants to go it alone,
and to bring his individual action with his own lawyer, should be per
mitted to do so." 39 The Committee's notes emphasized that courts
must ensure that (b) (3) class members have an opportunity to opt out
and cannot waive this right under any circumstances.40
Though the drafters of Rule 23 assumed that due process re
quired an opportunity to opt out, the Supreme Court did not con
sider the due process underpinnings for opt-out rights until Phillips
Petroleum v. Shutts, 41 nearly twenty years after the enactment of the
modern Rule 23. In Shutts, the Court's precise holding was not that
due process requires an opportunity to opt out for all (b) (3) class
members, but that due process mandates an opt-out opportunity for
out-of-state (b) (3) class members.42 In Shutts, almost all of the plain
tiff class members lacked minimum contacts with Kansas, the forum
state.43 Applying the jurisdictional principles of International Shoe Co.
v. Washington44 that courts normally apply to defendants, the Court
reasoned that plaintiff class members lacking minimum contacts with
the state could be bound only if they had consented to the court's
jurisdiction.45 The Court concluded that an out-of-state class member
who had no opportunity to exclude himself from the class could not
be said to have "consented" to the court's authority.46 Accordingly,
the Court held that, in addition to notice and adequate representa
tion, "due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be
provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by exe
cuting and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form to
the court."47
Despite Shutts's narrow holding, many courts have cited Shutts for
the proposition that due process requires an opportunity to opt out
for (b) (3) class actions, regardless of whether the class members have
38 Notes of Rules Advisory Committee to 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D.
69, 107 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Rules Advisory Notes].
39 Charles A. Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal and Appellate Procedure, 35 F.R.D. 317, 338 (1964).
40 1966 Rules Advisory Notes, supra note 38, at 106-07.
41 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
42 Id. at 812.
43 Id. at811.
44 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
45 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807-13.
46 Id. at 812-13.
47 Id. at 812.
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minimum contacts to the forum.48 The Supreme Court bolstered this
practice when it rearticulated Shutts's holding in Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 49 in language that focused more clearly on class members' prop
erty rights in the context of class action settlements. 50 The Court
stated that "before an absent class member s' right of action [is] extin
guishable due process require[s] 'at a minimum ...an absent plain
tiff ...be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the
class.'" 51 Though the Court included a footnote explaining that
Shutts only examined the procedural protections attendant on bind
ing out-of-state class members, 52 many commentators have concluded
that due process provides all (b) (3) class members the right to opt out
of a class action. 53
B.

Informed Opt Out and Due Process

While the majority view is that due process mandates an opt-out
opportunity for (b) (3) class members, the current consensus among
the courts is that "due process does not afford class members a second
opportunity to opt out."54 Most courts read Shutts to suggest that
48 See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc.,221 F.3d 870, 881 (6th Cir. 2000)
("[D]ue process requires that class members bringing particularized tort claims for
money damages be provided an opportunity to opt-out of the class."); Feuerman v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 96 Civ. 0120, 1996 WL 648966, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6,
1996) ("[M]inimum due process requirements are: adequate notice, an opportunity
to appear, an opportunity to opt out, and adequate representation."); Williams v.
Lane,129 F.R.D. 636,641 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts explicitly
held that due process required both notice and an opportunity to opt out before
judgment may bind a known but absent member of a damage-seeking class."); see also
Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,
80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1087 (1995) (noting that "[i]n Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, the Supreme Court held that in class actions brought for money damages . . .
due process requires that absent class members receive notice and the opportunity to
opt out").
49 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
50 id. at 848-49 (1999) (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812).
51 Id.
52 id. at 848 n.24.
53 See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 48, at 1087-88 (noting that "[i]n Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court held that in class actions brought for money dam
ages . . . due process requires that absent class members receive notice and the oppor
tunity to opt out").
54 In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 518 n.18
(E.D.N.Y. 2003); see Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,688 F.2d 615,635 (9th
Cir. 1982) ("[W)e have found no authority of any kind suggesting that due process
requires that members of a Rule 23 (b) (3) class be given a second chance to opt out.
We think it does not."); In re Lloyd's Am. Trust Fund Litig.,No. 96 Civ. 1262,2002 WL
31663577, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2002) ("If the proposed settlement is fair, ade-
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once an individual fails to opt out, she has "consented" to the court's
jurisdiction and thus has forgone her single opportunity to escape the
binding judgment ( or settlement) entered by the court. The Shutts
idea that failure to opt out equals consent is, of course, fictional. Class
members often do not have enough information by the opt-out dead
line to "consent" to the class action. Even if sufficient information
exists, some class members will not understand, read, or perhaps even
receive the notice informing them of the class action and their right
to opt out. 55 Even so, the Shutts holding requires only one chance to
opt out; it does not require an opportunity to make an informed
choice about whether to stay in the class.
Notwithstanding the absence of case law directly supporting a sec
ond opportunity to opt out, Rule 23's history demonstrates that the
drafters designed the opt-out provision not simply to satisfy the re
quirements of personal jurisdiction but to foster class members' abili
ties to decide whether to remain in the class action or pursue
individual litigation. 56 Paul Carrington and Derek Apanovitch assert
that "it was clearly understood in 1966 that no class member could
possibly be bound to a judgment who was not given actual notice of
the proceeding and in a position to exercise intelligently the choice to
opt out." 57
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that due process
procedures must be implemented in a manner calculated to accom
plish their purpose. For example, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 58 the Court held that "when notice is a person's due,
process which is a mere gesture is not due process" and that the "conquate and reasonable, due process does not afford Class Members a second opportu
nity to opt out.").
55 See 2003 Report of Rules Committee, supra note 1, at 190.
The presumption of consent that follows a failure to affirmatively opt out at
the time of certification may lose its footing when circumstances have
changed materially from the time when the class action is finally settled. In
these cases, a second opt-out opportunity could relieve individuals from the
unforeseen consequences of inaction or decisions made at the time of certi
fication, when limited meaningful information was available.
Id.
56 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
57 Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits ofJudicial
Rulemaking: The Invalidity of ProjJosed Ru'-e 23(b)(4), 39 ARiz. L. REv. 461, 489 (1997)
( emphasis added) (citing John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation ofProposed Ru'-e 23
on Class Actions, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, WORKING
PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO

CIVIL Ru LE 23, at 264, 269 (1997)).
58 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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stitutional validity" of a particular manner of notifying claim holders
should be judged by whether it was "reasonably certain to inform
those affected."59 Thus, the measure of whether notice complies with
due process is whether the manner in which the notice requirement is
carried out comports with the purpose of the notice requirement.
Similarly, in the context of the right to a hearing in individual litiga
tion, the Court has held that due process requires not only the oppor
tunity to be heard, but an "opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.' " 60 The Court has acknowledged
that a hearing which takes place at an inappropriate time may be "an
exercise in futility" that violates due process. 61
The prevailing practice under Rule 23-which provides a single
opportunity to opt out at a time when class members cannot intelli
gently decide whether to do so-is analogous to a notice procedure
that does not actually attempt to inform the persons affected and to a
hearing set too early or too late to preserve a person's rights. The due
process rights to potentially effective notice and hearings suggest that
opt-out opportunities should be structured in a way that gives
claimholders the ability to meaningfully exercise their right to opt
out.
Further support for an informed opt-out rule can be found in
recent opinions involving the subset of class actions in which attorneys
reach a settlement prior to filing the lawsuit. Several courts have held
that due process requires that class notices in settlement-only class ac
tions not only inform class members of their right to opt out, but also
describe the settlement terms so class members can make informed
decisions. 62 The Fifth Circuit held that a settlement-only class action
5 9 Id. at 315. The Court held that notice by publication did not satisfy due pro
cess when the names and addresses of the interested persons were known. Id. at
318-2 0.
60 City of Los Angeles v. David, 5 38 U.S. 715, 717 (2 003); see Richards v.Jefferson
County, 5 17 U.S. 793, 804 (1996) ("[The state] may not deprive a person of all ex
isting remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the State has no power to de
stroy, unless there is , or was, afforded to him some real opportunity to protect it.")
(citation omitted); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 5 5, 72 (1979) ("The Fourteenth Amend
ment re quires 'an opportunity ...granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.'") (citations omitted).
61 Barry, 443 U.S. at 74 (quoting Barchi v. Sarafan, 436 F. Supp. 775, 782
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); see Irene Sharf & Christine Hess, Comment, What Process Is Due? Un
accompanied Minors' Rights to Deportation Hearings, 1988 DuKE LJ. 114, 116 ("[T]he
exercise of a right that was created to protect constitutional entitlements ... must be
feasible.") (citing Haitian Refugee Ctr.v. Smith, 676F.2d 102 3, 1039 (5th Cir. 1982)).
62 See, e.g., Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67F.3d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir.
1995); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 5 5 2 F.2d 1088, 1103-05 (5th Cir.
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notice must not only meet Rule 23's formal requirement that the no
tice take the best form "practicable under the circumstances,"63 but
"must also contain information reasonably necessary to make a deci
sion to remain a class member and be bound by the final judgment or
opt out of the action." 64 The court went on to specify that the notice
"muit contain information that a reasonable person would consider to
be material in making an informed, intelligent decision of whether to
opt out or remain a member of the class and be bound by the final
judgment." 65 The court reasoned that "[i]f the initial class notice
does not include information of the proposed settlement ... an ab
sentee class member lacks an essential factor in the decisionmaking
equation."66 The Second Circuit has more explicitly stated that
"[d]ue process requires that the notice to class members fairly apprise
the . . . members of the class of the terms of the proposed settle
ment and of the options that are open to them." 67
The Fifth and Second Circuits' concern for the ability of class
members to know the settlement's terms echoes Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., in which the Supreme Court held that due
process requires that a claimholder receive notice of a pending action
in which her rights will be conclusively determined.68 In Mullane, the
Court noted that the right to be heard-"[t]he fundamental requisite
of due process"-"has little reality or worth unless one is informed
1977); Grunin v.Int'! House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 122 (8th Cir.1975); see also
32B AM.juR. 2d Federal Courts§ 2073 (1996).
The ...requirement that absentee class members be given the best notice
practicable under the circumstances demands that the class members re
ceive notice of a proposed settlement, since the members' rights are clearly
affected by the settlement, and without notice of it, the absentee class mem
ber lacks an essential factor affecting the decision whether to remain a mem
ber of the class.
Id.
63 FED.R. Civ. P.23(c)(2) (amended 2003). The current rule, changed by the
2003 revisions, provides more detailed requirements for the class notice. FED.R. CIV.
P.23(c)(2).
64 In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d at 1105 (citations omitted).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Maywalt, 67 F.3d at 1079. On this principle, some courts have required parties
to delay notifying the class until the settlement is sufficiently well-defined to allow
class members to make an informed choice about whether to opt out. For example,
one court concluded that" [a] full description of [the settlement terms] will need to
be determined .. . prior to any opt-out notices being sent to class members [because]
in the absence of such information, no informed opt-out decision could be made." In
re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 356 (N. D. Ohio 2001).
68 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear
or default, acquiesce or contest."69
The Fifth and Second Circuits' insistence that settlement-only
class members know the settlement's terms suggests there is a due pro
cess problem whenever class members do not know the terms of the
class settlement before the opt-out period expires.70 If it is a due,pro
cess violation for settlement-only class members to have to decide
whether to opt out v.rithout knowing the terms of the settlement, it is
also a due process violation to put traditional class action members in
the same position. There is no principled reason to deny traditional
class action members the right to informed choice that is guaranteed
to their counterparts in settlement-only class actions.
Courts have also noted that information famine violates due pro
cess in the context of settlements that purport to bind future claim
ants, such as persons who have been exposed to a cancer-causing
substance and have an indeterminate risk of future injury. In Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 71 the Supreme Court suggested that the in
ability of future claimants to predict the value of their potential future
claims in comparison with the terms of a known settlement might vio
late due process. 72 The Amchem class action-which involved asbes
tos-had been certified for settlement only, so class members knew
the terms of the settlement before the opt-out deadline. 73 However,
the class members who had not yet developed injuries as a result of
their exposure to asbestos could not predict the value of their claims.
The effects of asbestos can be latent for more than forty years and
while some exposed persons will develop serious diseases, some will
not. 74 The Court agreed with the Third Circuit's conclusion that the
class members with future claims "lack[ed] adequate information to
properly evaluate whether to opt out of the settlement." 75
69 Id. (emphasis added).
70 Informed opt out would "provide the same ability to opt out with knowledge of
the settlement terms that is enjoyed by members of the many (b) (3) classes that are
considered for certification-and thus afford a right to request exclusion-after a
settlement has been reached." 2003 Report of Rules Committee, supra note 1, at 189.
71 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
72 Id. at 628.
73 Id. at 597.
74 Id. at 598.
75 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 633 (3d Cir. 1996); see Amchem,
521 U.S. at 611 (recognizing "the unfairness of binding exposure-only plaintiffs who
might . . . lack sufficient information about their exposure to make a reasoned deci
sion whether to stay in or opt out" and criticizing the settlement for providing only
very limited opportunities for future claimants to exit the class when they developed
injuries).

THE REVISED CLASS ACTION RULE

393

The Court explained that the "serious fairness concerns"76 identi
fied by the Third Circuit were typified by class member Margaret
Balonis, the widow of a man who was symptom-free at the time the
opt-out period expired but developed a fatal asbestos-related disease a
few months thereafter.77 The Court noted that future claimants like
Mrs. Balonis "may not have the information or foresight needed to
decide, intelligently" whether to opt out of the class settlement.78 The
Third Circuit had acknowledged that the "powerful" due process ar
guments79 presented in Amchem suggest that Congress should amend
Rule 23 to provide additional opt-out rights for future claimants.80

The information famine that confronts class members in a tradi
tional class action is analogous to the predicament of future claimants.
Both future claimants and members of traditional class actions must
choose between accepting a settlement and preserving their individ
ual claim without knowing the value of one of the choices. At the
time the Amchem future claimants had to decide whether to opt out,
they knew the value of the settlement but did not know the value of
their claims. Traditional class members, at the time they must decide
whether to opt out, probably have some idea of the value of their
claims, but they do not know the value of the settlement. It is telling
that the settling parties in Amchem defended the unfair effects of their
settlement on future claimants by arguing that "the class members
[with future claims], having the terms of the settlement before them,
were in a better position to exercise a choice than the usual notice
recipient who has no idea how the case will come out."81
The emerging concern about information famine in Amchem and
the Fifth and Second Circuits' notice cases suggests that no (b) (3)
class member should have to decide whether to accept a settlement
76 Georgi,ne, 83 F.3d at 634.
77 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 605 n.7.
78 Id. at 628; see also Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 572 (E.D. Tex.
1974) (noting that persons "might neglect to 'opt-out' of the class, and then discover
some years in the future that they have contracted asbestosis, lung cancer or other
pulmonary disease").
79 Georgi,ne, 83 F.3d at 622.
80 See id. at 634-35 (suggesting that the Rules Committee or Congress could ad
dress due process problems implicated by future claims by providing for "opt-in clas
ses" or "classes with greater opt-out rights"). Ultimately, however, the Third Circuit
and the Supreme Court couched their disapproval of the Amchem settlement not in
terms of opt-out rights, but in terms of improper class certification-the class did not
meet Rule 23's requirements that absent class members be adequately represented by
class representatives and that common issues predominate over any questions affect
ing only individual members. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625; Georgi,ne, 83 F.3d at 617.
81 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629.
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agreement at a time when she has no idea what the terms of that set
tlement will be. Class members should have the ability to meaning
fully exercise their right to opt out. Plaintiffs in one-on-one litigation
have an absolute right to evaluate and reject settlement terms.82 Ac
cording to the Second and Fifth Circuits, plaintiffs in settlement-only
class actions also have the right to know settlement terms before de
ciding whether to opt out of a class action. Class members in tradi
tional (b) (3) class actions, who often have claims identical to plaintiffs
in settlement-only class actions and one-on-one litigation, should also
have the ability to make an informed choice.
C.

When Should Courts Provide a Second Opportunity to Opt Out?

The argument for informed opt out, outlined above, emphasizes
the need for class members to intelligently exercise their right to de
cide whether to remain in the class. Informed opt out is necessary to
achieve the purpose of opt-out rights and to harmonize the rights pro
vided to class action members with the rights provided to plaintiffs in
82 In fact, the public policy favoring an individual plaintiff's right to evaluate and
reject settlement terms is so strong that courts in most states will invalidate a client's
attempt to give up this right. See Ariz. Ethics Op. 94-03 (1994) (holding that a re
tainer agreement violated the professional rules of conduct when it gave the lawyer
broad power to abandon the client's case or settle it without the client's consent); In
re Grievance Proceeding, 171 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding that a written
fee agreement delegating all settlement authority to a lawyer violated Rule of Profes
sional Conduct l.2(a)); In re Lansky, 678 N.E.2d 1114 (Ind. 1997) (holding that a fee
agreement in which a client gave up her right to determine whether to accept a settle
ment offer violated Rule of Professional Conduct l.2(a)). Even agreements that
merely place economic pressure on the client to accept the attorney-approved settle
ment terms, rather than completely eliminate her choice, are invalid. See Conn. In
formal Ethics Op. 99-18 (1999) (holding that a contingent-fee agreement may not
include a clause requiring the client to pay the lawyer at an hourly rate if the client
rejects a settlement offer recommended by the lawyer and the defendant prevails, and
further noting that the client has the right to decide whether to accept a settlement
and that economic pressure limiting that right violates Rule of Professional Conduct
l.2(a)).
If the public policy favoring a client's right to evaluate settlement terms is so
strong that the courts will invalidate a client's attempt to contract around it, it seems
irrational to compel class action litigants to abdicate their authority to make settle
ment decisions. If an individual claimholder cannot contract to allow her trusted
individual attorney to make settlement decisions for her, a claimholder swept into
class action litigation should not be forced to surrender her decision-making author
ity to an attorney whom she most likely has never met. The class action claimholder,
even more than the individual claimholder, cannot predict, months or years before
settlement is reached, whether the attorney who represents her will deliver acceptable
settlement terms. She should not be forced to choose whether to accept a settlement
payout before knowing what the contours of that settlement will be.
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individual litigation. As the above argument acknowledges, however,
determining the specific requirements of due process in particular sit
uations involves balancing individual rights with the judicial system's
competing interest in efficiently resolving large numbers of similar
claims. 83 In most situations, the class members' rights to control their
claims will outweigh the costs of a second opt-out opportunity. How
ever, there may be situations in which the class members' interests in
controlling their claims are so small that the costs of a second oppor
tunity to opt out will outweigh its benefits. The next two sections out
line two factors courts should consider to determine, on a case by case
basis, whether to provide a second opt-out opportunity.
1.

The Inadequacy of Information at the Initial Opt-Out Deadline
Should Weigh in Favor of Providing a Second Opportunity
to Opt Out

The first factor a court should consider is whether the class mem
bers had insufficient information at the initial opt-out deadline to de
cide whether to stay in the class. In some situations, the class
members may know the settlement terms prior to the opt-out deadline
and thus not need a second chance to make an informed decision.
Accordingly, a second opt-out opportunity is unnecessary in set
tlement-only class actions in which plaintiff and defense counsel have
arrived at settlement terms before going to court. 84 In these situa
tions, one opt-out opportunity is sufficient because the initial notice
sent to class members will contain the terms of the settlement. At the
time of the opt-out deadline, a class member can simply estimate how
much he or she would recover in an individual lawsuit and compare
that amount with the amount he or she would receive under the
settlement.
Even though settlement-only class action notices often do not
specify the precise amount each class member will receive but instead
provide an estimate of settlement terms, the information contained
within the estimate will usually be sufficient to enable the class mem
bers to make a reasonably informed decision. Though it would be
83 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (explaining that "due pro
cess is flexible" and that the procedural protections mandated by due process vary
depending on the nature of the governmental and private interests involved).
84 See 2003 Report of Rules Committee, supra note 1, at 190.
The proposal will only make a difference in cases in which the class is certi
fied and the initial opt-out period expires before a settlement agreement is
reached. It is irrelevant in those cases in which a settlement agreement is
submitted to the court simultaneously with a request that a class be certified.
Id.
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hard to imagine a plaintiff in individual litigation binding herself to a
settlement when she knows only a rough approximation of the settle
ment's value, the benefits of efficient group settlement probably out
weigh this relatively small detriment to individual class members. A
court should provide a second opportunity to opt out, however, if the
court ultimately finds a significant disparity between the estimated
and final settlement terms.
2.

The Presence of Claims that Would Be Viable in Individual
Litigation Should Weigh in Favor of Providing a Second
Opportunity to Opt Out

The second factor a court should consider when deciding
whether to provide a second opportunity to opt out is the size of the
individual class members' claims. If no class members could feasibly
bring their claims in individual litigation, it may be reasonable for a
court to deny a second opt-out opportunity. 85 If, however, a signifi
cant number of the class members' claims would be economically via
ble in individual litigation, the class members should have the
opportunity to make an informed decision about whether to stay in
the class or litigate their claims individually.
A court should provide an informed opt-out opportunity in class
actions with high-value claims not only because persons with high
value claims have more to lose but also because they are more likely to
be harmed by the class action mechanism. 86 This is because plaintiff
class counsel has an incentive to undercut the interests of class mem
bers who hold high value claims. If class counsel acts in his rational
self-interest, he will seek to settle the class action to achieve the great
est possible personal profit in the shortest amount of time.87 Though
settlements involving outright collusion between class counsel and the
85 Courts widely acknowledge that the rationale for the class action procedure is
most compelling when the cost for each claimholder to bring an individual lawsuit
would exceed her potential recovery. In fact, several courts have hinted that the supe
riority requirement for class certification may require the presence of negative-value
claims. See Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 211 F.3d 1228, 1241 n.21 (11th Cir. 2000);
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 420 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Castano v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.,
51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
86 See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 CoLUM. L. REv. 149, 162 (2003) (noting that persons with strong claims
are most at risk from the monopoly power wielded by class counsel).
87 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
CoLUM. L. REv. 669, 685 (1986).
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defendant may be rare,88 even the most well-intentioned class attorney
can easily bow to defendant pressure to push the recovery of high
value claimants toward the average. 89 Furthermore, the courts
which must approve class settlements as fair-often lack adequate in
formation to probe settlement agreements for potential fairness con
cerns not brought to their attention by class counsel. 90 Even if the
court has adequate information, there will often be a sizable gap be
tween the settlement a court will approve and the settlement an indi
vidual claimholder would voluntarily accept.
As Richard Nagareda has suggested, informed opt out would be
an effective check on the tendency of class counsel to accept settle
ment terms unfavorable to high value claimholders. Nagareda ex
plains that, from the perspective of class counsel, the exit of a class
member corresponds to the entry of a competing attorney who will
take a piece of the pie formerly held intact by class counsel's represen
tation of all the claimants in the class. 91 Opt out-or merely the
threat of opt out-serves to discipline class counsel to work harder to
negotiate a settlement acceptable to the members of the class who
have the most to lose. The same threat motivates defendants to com
promise so they can achieve global peace. Accordingly, when a class
contains members who could litigate their claims on their own, the
court should provide class members the opportunity to intelligently
decide whether to remain in the class.
By contrast, a judge could reasonably deny a second opt-out op
portunity to a class in which none of the members could feasibly bring
their claims in individual litigation. Though a holder of a nominal
claim possesses a property interest just like the holder of a high-value
claim, there is a reasonable argument that the efficiency of resolving a
large number of claims at once outweighs the low-value claimholder's
interest in intelligently exerting control over her claim. The informa
tion famine created by a single opt-out procedure has far less adverse
impact on persons holding claims they would never bring in individ88 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 19, at 93-99 (explaining that while conventional
wisdom is that collusion between class attorneys and defendants is a serious problem,
there has been very little research attempting to quantify the problem).
89 See Nagareda, supra note 86, at 167 (noting that high value claimholders are
most at risk because "[t]he greater the variance in claim value, the more fervent the
effort at variance reduction through the embrace of a class settlement that dampens
the prospect for variance at the high end of the damage scale and pushes payouts
toward the average").
90 See id. at 169 (noting that "courts, at best, are awkwardly suited for this role, for
it requires them to act contrary to their self-interest in docket clearance").
91

See id. at 170.

NOT RE DA M E LAW REVIEW

398

[VOL. 80:1

ual litigation. Arguably, these claimholders do not need to know the
terms of the settlement in order to decide intelligently whether to stay
in the class or opt out. They know that they would not bring their
claims in individual litigation and accordingly can easily realize that
any amount of recovery the class action provides would be larger than
nothing, the amount they would otherwise receive. Furthermore, the
low-value claimholder who wishes to litigate her claim in an individual
lawsuit for non-economic reasons92 will have all the information she
needs to decide whether to do so by the normal opt-out deadline.
Drawing on general legal billing practices, a court should be able
to distinguish between claims that feasibly could be brought in indi
vidual litigation and those that could not. Prevailing norms should
indicate which claims are economically viable. If the claimholder
could not retain an attorney on a contingent-fee basis and the lodestar
fees that would be necessary to litigate the claim would exceed the
likely recovery, the claim is not economically viable.
D.

Informed Opt Out Will Not Significantly Affect the Efficiency of
Class Settlement

The primary fear associated with providing class members a sec
ond opportunity to opt out is that the availability of such an opportu
nity would impede settlement. In the context of explaining the 2003
revisions to Rule 23, the Rules Advisory Committee indicated that it
chose to recommend a discretionary rather than automatic second
opt-out opportunity because of the large number of comments it re
ceived reflecting the widely-held assumption that an informed opt-out
rule would impede settlement. The Committee reported that many
commentators shared "the view that good settlements may be de
feated by a settlement opt-out opportunity."93
The widespread concern about the defeat of "good settlements"
embodies a general feeling that a few members of a class should not
be permitted to "spoil" the settlement by exiting the class after settle
ment terms are reached. 94 It is not at all clear, however, that in92 Non-economic reasons that might motivate a claimholder to litigate a non
economically viable claim include the desire to litigate "for the principle of the thing"
and to raise public awareness of the defendant's wrongdoing.
93 2003 Report of Rules Committee, supra note 1, at 244.
94 See, e.g., Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 639 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(stating that a few class members with high claims "should not .. . be allowed to play
the role of spoilers" for the rest of the class); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class
as Party and Client, 73 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 954-55 (1998) (suggesting that the
interests of the class as a whole would "be severely undermined and potentially de
stroyed if individual members could opt out at will"); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the

2004)
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formed opt out would actually pose a danger to "good settlements."
In individual litigation, a "good settlement" would be one to which all
the persons involved voluntarily give their consent after considering
the value of the settlement terms vis-a-vis the strength of their claims.
To the extent that class members would not choose to consent to the
terms of a class settlement, it is difficult to claim that the settlement is
a "good" one. The primary groups that express concern about the
defeat of "good settlements" are defendants, defense attorneys, and
class attorneys-the persons who stand to gain from settlements that
provide class members less than they would achieve in individual
litigation.95
Furthermore, providing class members the ability to make in
formed choices about whether to exit the class would not work an
injustice on the class members who choose to stay. Admittedly, the
exit of some class members (most likely those with stronger claims)
might reduce the compensation other class members would receive in
the settlement if the defendant was willing to pay a premium for the
ability to settle with all the claimholders at once. 96 Though the loss of
premium payment when some claimholders opt out is unfortunate
from the perspective of class members who choose to stay in the class
(most likely those with weaker claims), it is not unfair. The substan
tive law dictates that many injured persons will not receive compensa
tion through the legal system (because, for example, they have
causation or statute of limitations problems) while others may recover
in excess of their actual loss.
As Richard Nagareda has noted, while the combination of strong
and weak claims in a class action may work to increase the amount the
defendant pays to holders of weak claims, weak claim holders have no
"right" to the additional amount that they could not achieve on their
own. 97 This additional amount largely results from the cost savings
associated with settling large numbers of claims at once and the assurAdequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REv. 571, 612 (1997) ("Because defend

ants may refuse to settle unless they obtain a global settlement, the refusal of some
class members to settle may in fact deny other class members the ability to settle their
claims, requiring them instead to assume the risk of trial."). Some commentators
have gone so far as to suggest that as a precondition to opt out, there should be a
good cause hearing at which the court would balance the interest of the litigant in
seeking to exit the class against those of the class members who would thereby be
injured. See, e.g., American Bar Ass'n Section of Litig., Report and Recommendations of
the Special Committee on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 202 (1986).
95 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 19, at 93-99.
96 In fact, defendants will likely protect themselves by conditioning settlement
agreements on a maximum number of opt outs.
97 Nagareda, supra note 86, at 217.
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ance-if "global peace" is achieved-that the defendant will not have
to defend against any more claims of the same type.98 If the potential
cost-savings evaporate because persons with high-value claims opt out
of the class, low-value claimholders have not lost anything to which
they were previously entitled. 99 In our current legal system, it would
be unjust to short-circuit substantive tort law by forcing all class mem
bers to remain in a class action. In the absence of a true limited-fund
scenario, claimholders should not be forced to accept lower recov
eries than they could recover in one-on-one litigation simply because
many other people suffered a similar injury. 100
Furthermore, it is not inevitable that informed opt out would be
less efficient than the current single opt-out procedure. Though
many courts and commentators have assumed that informed opt out
would result in a higher total number of persons exiting the class, they
have developed this view by considering the issue at the time settle
ment terms are reached. They have not considered the possibility that
the information famine inherent in the current single opt-out proce
dure may lead some class members to opt out of the class who would
have chosen to stay in the class if they had the ability to know the
settlement terms at the time of their decision. A risk-averse game
show contestant may choose to settle for the prize he has seen rather
than gamble on a concealed-potentially larger or smaller-prize. 101
It is even more likely that an injured person with real financial need
like your friend Alice, discussed supra102-will opt for the individual
recovery she can estimate and, to some extent, control, rather than
bind herself to accept an unknown class action settlement. The Fifth
Circuit acknowledged this possibility in the context of a settlement
only class action. 103 It concluded that providing less than complete
information about the settlement terms was inconsistent with the goal
of having the class settlement dispose of as many claims as possible,
noting that "[t]he binding scope of the present action would be di
rectly diminished by that number of class members who decided to
opt out of the action but who otherwise would have utilized the class
action device if information of the proposed settlement had appeared
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Trangsrud, supra note 20, at 87.
101 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1 (noting the human tendency to
prefer to "bear those ills we have / Than fly to others that we know not of'); see also
the traditional Latin proverb "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush."
102 See supra pp. 377-79.
103 See In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088, 1105-06 (5th Cir.
1977).
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[in the notice] ." 104 Thus, it is possible that informed opt out may in
fact increase the number of claims settled because it will keep claim
ants in the class for a longer period of time. Instead of hastily opting
out at the commencement of the action, claimholders could wait to
make an informed decision.
CONCLUSION

The 2003 revISions to the federal class action rule empower
courts to cure the problem of information famine often faced by the
members of (b) (3) class actions. The revisions, however, make exer
cise of this power purely discretionary. This Note has argued that
courts should liberally use their authority to provide class members
the ability to make informed opt-out decisions. Courts should provide
class members a second opportunity to opt out when two factors are
present: when (1) the class members had inadequate information at
the initial opt-out deadline and (2) it would be economically feasible
for class members to pursue their claims in individual litigation.
Though the current majority view is that due process does not
require a second opportunity to opt out, recent cases evidence a grow
ing concern that the information famine suffered by class members
when they blindly exercise their single right to opt out violates due
process. Much like class members who cannot evaluate the adequacy
of a proposed settlement because they have not yet suffered injury,
class members who must decide whether to opt out before the settle
ment terms are known cannot evaluate whether their interests would
be better served by opting out or remaining in the class.
Even if due process does not require informed opt out, basic fair
ness suggests that (b) (3) class members with economically viable
claims should have the ability-guaranteed to plaintiffs in individual
litigation and to many class members in settlement-only class ac
tions-to make an informed decision about whether to accept a settle
ment. Contrary to widely-held assumptions, informed opt out will not
necessarily impede the efficiency of good class settlements. It will in
stead ensure that class members are not forced to swallow settlement
terms they would have never accepted voluntarily. Liberal use of Rule
23's new informed opt-out provision will not only alleviate the predica
ment faced by members of (b) (3) class actions, but will also give new
life and legitimacy to Rule 23 (b) (3).

104

Id. at 1106.

